Pascoa (1993a) showed that the failure of the law of large numbers for a continuum of independent randomizatons implies that Schmeidler's (1973) concept of a measure-valued profile function in equilibrium might not coincide with the concept of mixed strategies equilibrium of a nonatomic game....

Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. There are other solutions, like the -Nash equilibria, which enjoy nice properties and appear to be...

Any correlated equilibrium of a strategic game with bounded payoffs and convex strategy sets which has a smooth concave potential, is a mixture of pure strategy profiles which maximize the potential. If moreover, the strategy sets are compact and the potential is strictly concave, then the game...

Economic models usually assume that agents play precise best responses to others' actions. It is sometimes argued that this is a good approximation when there are many agents in the game, because if their mistakes are independent, aggregate uncertainty is small. We study a class of games in...

The paper develops a model of non-interlinkage between a trader and a large farmer. The trader faces better terms in the product market while the farmer has a clear edge over the former in the credit market. The paper shows that there are still gains from trade between the two, using a Nash...

The present note extends Debreus's equilibrium existence theorem for a generalized game in the context of finite- dimensional strategy spaces, by weakening the upper semicontinuity and closed-valuedness assumption on the feasible strategy multifunctions. This is made by establishing an...

This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)’s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai’s measure captures...

This paper shows a fundamental property of vector fields representing dynamics on spaces of mixed strategies of normal form games whose zeros coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying games. The property shown is that the indices of components of zeros of any vector field in this class...

In game theory, p-dominance and p-best response sets serve as important robustness solution concepts by allowing for deviations from the stringent common knowledge requirements of Nash equilibrium. However, solving for such sets remains largely intractable beyond the simplest of settings. The...

This paper studies games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and more generally, games with strategic heterogeneity (GSH). Such games may behave differently from either games with strategic complements or games with strategic substitutes. Under mild assumptions (on one or...