Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

This paper investigates the effectiveness of the legal exception system (Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003) by running a Monte Carlo simulation for different only vaguely known input parameters of the system. Effectiveness is operationalized via the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 101 TFEU, i.e....

This paper examines the effects of European Commission's (EC) new leniency program on the EC's capabilities in detecting and deterring cartels. As a supplementary analysis, the US leniency is studied. I discuss a dynamic model of cartel formation and dissolution to illustrate how changes in...

We discuss welfare and various policy interventions for mixed ICT markets where firms use either 'open source' (OS) or 'closed source' (CS) business models. We find that the existence of OS business models improves social welfare compared to all-CS industries by letting firms share costs and...

In June 2008 the European Commission adopted a system of direct settlement for cartel cases, inspired by a comparative glance across the Atlantic where the majority of antitrust defendants enter negotiated guilty pleas. Whereas settlements in Europe are viewed as a method for expediting the...

This paper investigates the effectiveness of the new Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 which replaces the mandatory notification and authorization system by a legal exception system. Effectiveness is operationalized via the two subcriteria compliance to Art. 81 EC Treaty and the probabilities of...

International cartelists today face antitrust investigations and possible fines in a score of national and supranational jurisdictions. This paper aims at providing quantitative information about the size and impacts of international cartel activity in Asia and uses a sample of modern private...

This paper experimentally analyzes the effects of non-discriminatory and discriminatory leniency policies on hard-core cartels. We design a mechanism to form a hard-core cartel, which allows that multiple ringleaders emerge. Ringleaders often take a leading role in the coordination and formation...