In this paper we study the economic consequences of two real-time electricity market designs (with or without penalties) taking into account the opportunistic behaviors of market players. We implement a two-stage dynamic model to consider the interaction between the forward market and the...

In this paper we study the economic consequences of two real-time electricity market designs (with or without penalties) taking into account the opportunistic behaviors of market players. We implement a two-stage dynamic model to consider the interaction between the forward market and the...

It is puzzling today to explain both the diversity and the rationale of regulators' practice vis-à-vis network monopolies. We argue that two fundamental characteristics should be considered when defining the most appropriate regulatory tools. First, it is the bounded endowment of regulators set...

L'activation de la demande électrique permet d'atteindre des objectifs d'efficacité énergétique et environnementale grâce à la maîtrise des consommations (ou DSM pour Demand Side Management). De nombreux pilotes menés ces dix dernières années permettent d'avoir une représentation...

Network regulation is playing an active role in a context of restructuring energy systems for long term transition to a smart grid. Regulation of network companies' activities should consider both cost efficiency objectives and other objectives such as quality and network innovation. It is in...

The aim of this work is to demonstrate analytically under what conditions activating elasticity of demand of consumers could be beneficial for the social welfare. It has added to the literature on analyzing the use of price signals in eliciting demand response by an analytical approach. We...

Demand side management (DSM) in electricity markets could improve energy efficiency and achieve environmental targets through controlled consumption. For the past 10 years or so DSM programmes have registered significant results. However, detailed analysis of its real impact as observed by a...

In this paper we study the problem of long-term capacity adequacy in electricity markets. We implement a dynamic model in which operators compete for investment and electricity production under imperfect Cournot competition. The main aim of this work is tocompare three investment incentive...