If market economy are to work, they need institutions of economic governance. In traditional economics, there seems universal agreement that the framework of contract law provided by the government is a necessary condition for a market economy to work. Recently, the complementary relationship...

This paper establishes a simple no-bubble theorem that applies to a wide range of deterministic models with in nitely lived consumers. Our model assumes only a sequential budget constraint and strictly monotone preferences. In this general setup, we show that asset bubbles are impossible if a...

We conducted a market experiment in China to examine potential effects of subjects' hometowns on their behaviors as well as potential differences between team and individual trades. We observed that group size affected bargaining power and subsequently payoffs in different directions according...

We develop a small open economy, New Keynesian model that incorporates a financial accelerator in combination with liability dollarization. Applying a Ramsey-type analysis, we compare the welfare implications of an optimal monetary policy under flexible exchange rates and an optimal capital...

This paper examines the differences in accrual-based and real earnings management across countries from the perspective of investor protection. Following prior research (Leuz et al., 2003), we hypothesize that accrual-based earnings management is more constrained by strict discipline in...

Over the past two decades, considerable interest has grown in high growth firms (HGFs). However, the concept of HGFs still remains controversial. One of the most controversial issues is size and age of these firms. The present study argues that the current literature on HGFs may offer little...

We study a one-dimensional voting game in which voters choose a policy from a one-dimensional policy set over which voters have single-peaked preferences. The purpose of this paper is to analyze coalitional behaviors under any given voting mechanism. We employ the notion of strong Nash...