We consider a model consisting of a monopolistic firm producing a certain good with pollution. This firm can adopt a cleaner technology within a finite time by incurring an investment cost decreasing exponentially with the adoption date. At each period of time, the firm is regulated by an...

We study the consumption based asset pricing model in a discrete time pure exchange setting with incomplete information. Incomplete information leads to a filtering problem which agents solve using the Kalman filter. We characterize the solution to the asset pricing problem in such a setting....

This paper analyzes the expected life-time utility and the hedging demands in a Lucas (1978) economy, in which the dividend drift term is unknown and mean-reverting. An expression for the individual investor’s expected life-time utility in equilibrium is derived, and his hedging demand is...

A firm must decide whether to launch a new product. A launch implies considerable fixed costs, so the firm would like to assess downstream demand before it decides. We study under which conditions a potential buyer would be willing to reveal his willingness to pay under different pricing...

In this paper, we analyze cases where consumers are aware of the existence of two qualities but do not know which firm sells the good one. We show that if the production of the high quality requires higher cost, its producer may be severly disadvantaged, even if the additional utility fully...

Asymmetric information refers to that uncertainty which arises as a result of co-ordination problems between two agents. This has a limited applicability in the understanding of how businessmen attempt to protect themselves against the possible fluctuation in macro-economic variables and from a...

The article compares civil strife in the public arena to labor strikes in the private arena. Both are predicated on incomplete information (both sides believing they can "win," when one – and possibly both – must "lose"). Reasons for conflict, especially in Africa, include the rent-based...

Empirical research suggests that – despite strengthening conventional incentives to put in effort – exerting control might reduce worker performance. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can explain such hidden costs of control if individuals differ in their propensity...

In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

We consider situations in which individuals would like to choose an action which is close to that of others, as well as close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, a cheap-talk communication stage is offered to...