Following the recent generalization of social choice in the literature on judgment aggregation, we extend the analysis of freedom of choice from sets of alternatives to sets of opinions. We establish the analogue of the cardinality based freedom of choice measure and suggest an alternative...

Assume that two players have strict rankings over an even number of indivisible items. We propose algorithms to find allocations of these items that are maximin—maximize the minimum rank of the items that the players receive—and are envy-free and Pareto-optimal if such allocations exist. We...

Many procedures have been suggested for the venerable problem of dividing a set of indivisible items between two players. We propose a new algorithm (AL), related to one proposed by Brams and Taylor (BT), which requires only that the players strictly rank items from best to worst. Unlike BT, in...

The purpose of this note is to shed some light on the relationship between the Copeland rule and the Condorcet principle in those cases where there does not exist a Condorcet winner. It will be shown that the Copeland rule ranks alternatives according to their distances to being a Condorcet...

A cake is a metaphor for a heterogeneous, divisible good, such as land. A perfect division of cake is efficient (also called Pareto-optimal), envy-free, and equitable. We give an example of a cake in which it is impossible to divide it among three players such that these three properties are...

The purpose of this paper is to provide a binary comparison of two distance-based preference aggregation rules, Slater's rule and Kemeny''s rule. It will be shown that for certain lists of individual preferences the outcomes will be antagonistic in the sense that what is considered best...