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Bilateral Information Sharing in Oligopoly
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - Dipartimento di Economia, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia - 2007
We study the problem of information sharing in oligopoly, when sharing decisions are taken before the realization of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005057151
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Information sharing in oligopoly : sharing groups and core-periphery architectures
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17
The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm's private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013171765
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Information sharing networks in oligopoly
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - 2008
information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then pairwise stable networks of sharing agreements are either empty or made of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293393
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Bilateral information sharing in oligopoly
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - 2007
We study the problem of information sharing in oligopoly, when sharing decisions are taken before the realization of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293423
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Information sharing in oligopoly: Sharing groups and core-periphery architectures
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - In: Games 12 (2021) 4, pp. 1-17
The trade-off between the costs and benefits of disclosing a firm's private information has been the object of a vast literature. The absence of incentives to share information on a common market demand prior to competition has been advocated to interpret information sharing as evidence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200157
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Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - 2013
stable networks for the general linear quadratic game. For the case of correlated signals, we study pair-wise stable networks … for three specific linear quadratic games - Cournot oligopoly, Keynes' beauty contest and Public good provision - in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010313224
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Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - 2013
stable networks for the general linear quadratic game. For the case of correlated signals, we study pair-wise stable networks … for three specific linear quadratic games - Cournot oligopoly, Keynes' beauty contest and Public good provision - in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009756291
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Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly
Currarni, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - Dipartimento di Economia, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia - 2008
information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then pairwise stable networks of sharing agreements are either empty or made of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005106145
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Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2013
stable networks for the general linear quadratic game. For the case of correlated signals, we study pair-wise stable networks … for three specific linear quadratic games - Cournot oligopoly, Keynes’ beauty contest and Public good provision - in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665515
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Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly
Currarini, Sergio; Feri, Francesco - Institut für Finanzwissenschaft, Fakultät für …
information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then pairwise stable networks of sharing agreements are either empty or made of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005427647