Let v be a vector of votes for parties and s a vector of their seats gained in the House of Commons or the House of Representatives. We use a single zero for the lumped category of "Other", of the wasted vote, for parties that got votes but no seats. Let V = 1'v be total turnout and S = 1's the...

This paper gives an economic analysis of the design of electoral systems. It particular it evaluates how political science has been dealing with this issue. The main choice is between either district representation (DR) or equal or proportional representation (EPR). It appears that DR...

The correlation between two vectors is the cosine of the angle between the centered data. While the cosine is a measure of association, the literature has spent little attention to the use of the sine as a measure of distance. A key application of the sine is a new “sine-diagonal inequality /...

This study examines the impact of social preferences on the individual incentives of participating in climate coalitions with laboratory experimental evidences. The theoretical result suggests that, when a player was inequality-neutral, a dominant strategy equilibrium could exist. However,...

The correlation between two vectors is the cosine of the angle between the centered data. While the cosine is a measure of association, the literature has spent little attention to the use of the sine as a measure of distance. A key application of the sine is a new "sine-diagonal inequality /...

This study examines the impact of social preferences on the individual incentives of participating in climate coalitions with laboratory experimental evidence. The theoretical result suggests that, when players are self-interested, dominant strategy equilibrium could exist conditionally. Players...

We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk, one for constant population cases, the other an extension to variable populations. Intra and interpersonal welfare comparisons are encoded in a single `individual preorder'. The individual preorder then uniquely determines a...

In this paper we have analyzed sequencing problem from both incentive and normative aspects. We have identified unique class of VCG mechanisms that ensures egalitarian equivalence and we also have shown the possibility result with identical costs lower bound in that unique class of VCG...

This paper investigates the impact of a negative socioeconomic shock on generosity by analysing the responses of 1255 US citizens to dictator games spread out over eight weeks of the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Each respondent plays four dictator games corresponding to four different...

We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of self-governance. Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced....