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Creating a Winner's Curse via Jump Bids
Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2015
We show that jump bids can be used by a bidder to create a winner's curse and preserve an informational advantage that would otherwise disappear in the course of an open ascending auction. The eect of the winner's curse is to create allocative distortions and reduce the seller's expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261195
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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855888
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Auctioning horizontally differentiated items
Parlane, Sarah - 2005
This paper analyses strategic market allocation by two auctioneers holding substitutes. It characterizes both the cooperative and competitive outcomes. Under cooperation or competition with close substitutes, bidders are allocated according to the expected total surplus each generates. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293857
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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010027
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Efficient Auctions.
Dasgupta, P.; Maskin, E. - Harvard Institute of Economic Research (HIER), … - 1998
). Nevertheless, we show that the Vickrey auctin can be generalized to attain efficiency when there are common values, provided each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245615
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On the Optimality of Not Allocating
Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2014
We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an indivisible unit.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842901
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Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Angel; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2013
We show that open ascending auctions are prone to inecient rushes, i.e. all bidders quitting at the same price, in … market environments such as privatizations, takeover contests, and procurement auctions. Rushes arise when an incumbent with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842918
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The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions.
Neeman, Z. - Department of Economics, Boston University - 1998
We study the performance of English and second price auctions in which the seller sets an optimal reserve price given …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669843
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Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
Swinkels, Jeroen M. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1996
We consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly for … who value them most. We show that, none the less, such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient as the number of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824517
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Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions with Costly Information
Jackson, Matthew O. - EconWPA - 2002
contrast to the costless information case. Moreover, for a wide class of auctions if the cost of information is not … mechanism for which there exist equilibria and for which (weak) efficiency is achieved as the economy grows in the face of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135078