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Creating a Winner's Curse via Jump Bids
Ettinger, David; Michelucci, Fabio - Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and … - 2015
We show that jump bids can be used by a bidder to create a winner's curse and preserve an informational advantage that would otherwise disappear in the course of an open ascending auction. The eect of the winner's curse is to create allocative distortions and reduce the seller's expected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261195
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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011855888
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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Hernando-Veciana, Ángel; Michelucci, Fabio - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 1, pp. 273-306
because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010027
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Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions with Costly Information
Jackson, Matthew O. - EconWPA - 2002
contrast to the costless information case. Moreover, for a wide class of auctions if the cost of information is not … mechanism for which there exist equilibria and for which (weak) efficiency is achieved as the economy grows in the face of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135078
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Auctioning Horizontally Differentiated Items
Parlane, Sarah - School of Economics, University College Dublin - 2005
This paper analyses strategic market allocation by two auc- tioneers holding substitutes. It characterizes both the cooperative and com- petitive outcomes. Under cooperation or competition with close substitutes, bidders are allocated according to the expected total surplus each generates. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005685965
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The Effectiveness of Simple Auctions.
Neeman, Z. - Department of Economics, Boston University - 1998
We study the performance of English and second price auctions in which the seller sets an optimal reserve price given …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669843
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Efficiency in Optimal Auctions with Common Uncertainty
Kwong, Lester M.K. - Department of Economics, Brock University - 2005
This paper considers optimal auctions where individuals' valuations have both a private and common value component. We … outcome, efficiency will be restored in the optimal auction. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168872
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Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
Swinkels, Jeroen M. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1996
We consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly for … who value them most. We show that, none the less, such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient as the number of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824517
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Second Best Efficiency in Auctions
Veciana, Ángel Hernando; Michelucci, Fabio - Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) - 2008
We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a single-unit sale when the efficient allocation is not implementable. This allocation may involve no selling when it is efficient to sell. We then show that the English auction always implements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005731223
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Efficient Mechanism Design
Krishna, Vijay; Perry, Motty - EconWPA - 1997
auctions in situations where bidders have privately known "demand curves'' and extended to include situations with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118596