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We present a general and tractable oligopoly model of multi-sided platforms with endogenous side and platform choices of heterogeneous end-users, considering any mix of single-homing and multi-homing platforms and in which participating on one side could preclude doing so on others. We show the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014443980
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190075
Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005008038
We study the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation (JPE, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743475
Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner’s Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game’s history throughout the network. The delay in receiving...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008674329
We study the Diamond–Dybvig model of financial intermediation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116625
Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by allocating the players to a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors’ behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game’s history truthfully throughout the network....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230891