We consider agents playing a linear network game with strategic complementarities. We analyse the problem of a policy maker who can change the structure of the network in order to increase the aggregate efforts of the individuals and/or the sum of their utilities, given that the number of links...

What do firms learn from their interactions in markets, and what are the implications for aggregate dynamics? We address this question in a multi-sector real-business cycle model with a sparse input-output structure. In each sector, firms observe their own productivity, along with the prices of...

This paper demonstrates that the interactions of firm-level indivisible investments give rise to aggregate fluctuations without aggregate exogenous shocks. I develop a method to derive the distribution of the aggregate capital growth rate by embedding a fictitious tatonnement in a branching...

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model, where investors have private information about asset payo¤s, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of...

We present a model of neighborhood effects in wage payment delays. Positive feedback arises because each employer’s arrears affect the late payment costs faced by other firms in the same local labor market, resulting in a strategic complementarity in the practice. The model is estimated on...

This paper demonstrates endogenous fluctuations of aggregate investments when firm-level investments follow an (S,s) policy and exhibit strategic complementarity. We present a method to characterize the aggregate fluctuations that arise from the interaction of the (S,s) policies. A closed-form...

We highlight the role of duration and exchange rate risks on portfolio flows by using a unique and comprehensive database of US investor flows into emerging market government bonds denominated in local currency. Borrowing long-term mitigates roll-over risk but amplifies valuation changes that...

Two groups produce a network good perceived by a third party, such as a police or military institution, as a "public bad", referred to as "crime" for simplicity. These two groups, considered mafias, are assumed to be antagonists, whether they are enemies or competitors in the same market,...