This paper investigates a pricing model for an electricity market with a hybrid congestion management method, i.e. part of the system applies a nodal pricing scheme and the rest applies a zonal pricing scheme. The model clears the zonal and nodal pricing areas simultaneously. The nodal pricing...

Our paper applies data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic non-parametric envelopment of data (StoNED) to measure cost efficiency of electricity distribution companies. The data cover 123 Norwegian electricity distribution companies during 2004-2010, and the performance of these companies...

In the Nordic day-ahead electricity market zonal pricing or market splitting is used for relieving congestion between a predetermined set of bidding areas. This congestion management method represents an aggregation of individual connection points into bidding areas, and flows from the actual...

We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...

This paper proposes a new measure for a group's ability to lead society to adopt their standard of behavior, which in particular takes account of the time the group takes to convince the whole society to adopt their position. This notion of a group's power to initiate action is computed as the...

We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i's prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...

The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to adopt a new behavior or technology or stay with the default...

We consider a game played by a state sponsor of terrorism, a terrorist group, and the target of terrorist attacks. The sponsoring state wishes to see as much damage inflicted on the target of attack as possible, but wishes to avoid retaliation. To do so, his relationship with the terrorist group...