coalitions also their union is feasible. Properties of solutions (the core, the nucleolus, the prekernel and the Shapley value …

Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a … each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core … allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his …

This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus and compromise value. It is seen … that the 1-nucleolus of a cooperative game can be characterized using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for … associated bankruptcy problems. In particular, for any zero-normalized balanced game, the 1-nucleolus coincides with the Aumann …

in Baltic Sea. The characteristic func-tion is constructed and the Shapley value and the nucleolus are used as one …

nucleolus. This paper is an update on the nucleolus and its two related supersolutions, i.e., the kernel and the bargaining set. …

theoretical knowledge we present and compare seven properties of fair profit sharing. Findings: We show that the nucleolus is a … core-solution, which does not fulfil aggregate monotonicity. In contrast the Shapley value is an aggregate monotonic … solution but does not belong to the core of every cooperative game. Moreover, we present the Lorenz dominance as an additional …

. For the nucleolus in contrast, none of the pipelines has any strategic relevance at all, which contradicts the empirical …

coalitions determine both the core and the nucleolus in monotonic games whenever the core is non-empty. We show how these two …We provide a new modus operandi for the computation of the nucleolus in cooperative games with transferable utility … sample computation of the nucleolus of bankruptcy games - the shortest of its kind. …