We consider a version of the intertemporal general equilibrium model of Cox et al. (1985a) with a single production process and two correlated state variables. It is assumed that only one of them, Y2, has shocks correlated with those of the economy's output rate and, simultaneously, that the...

We derive a closed-form solution for the price of a European call option in the presence of ambiguity about the stochastic process that determines the variance of the underlying asset's return. The option pricing formula of Heston (1993) is a particular case of ours, corresponding to the case in...

This paper studies exchange economies in which agents have differential information about the goods that the other agents bring to the market. To study such a setting, it is useful to distinguish goods not only by their physical characteristics, but also by the agent that brings them to the...

We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...

We study competition between two shopping centers that sell the same set of goods and are located at the extremes of a linear city, without restricting consumers to make all their purchases at a single place. In the case of competition between a shopping mall (set of independent single-product...

Literature on dynamic portfolio choice has been finding that volatility risk has low impact on portfolio choice. For example, using long-run U.S. data, Chacko and Viceira (2005) found that intertemporal hedging demand (required by investors for protection against adverse changes in volatility)...

We study sustainability of collusion with optimal penal codes, in markets where demand growth may trigger the entry of a new firm. In contrast with grim trigger strategies, optimal penal codes make collusion easier to sustain before entry than after. We compare different reactions of the...

We study optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire-building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information but actual cost (difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of multidimensional...