We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...

This paper analyses price competition under product differentiation when goods are defined ina two dimensional characteristic space, and consumers do not know which firm sells whichquality. Equilibrium prices consist of two additive terms, which balance consumers' relativevaluation of goods'...

Using a Markov-perfect equilibrium model, we show that the use of customer data to practice intertemporal price discrimination will improve monopoly profit if and only if information precision is higher than a certain threshold level. This U-shaped relationship lends support to a popular view...

We consider a non-durable good monopoly that collects data on its customers in order to profile them and subsequently practice price discrimination on returning customers. The monopolist's price discrimination scheme is leaky, in the sense that an endogenous fraction of consumers choose to incur...

A durable good monopolist faces a continuum of heterogeneous customers who make purchase decisions by comparing present and expected price-quality offers. The monopolist designs a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We consider the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a game...

This article analyzes price competition in a duopolistic newspaper industry, where politically differentiated newspapers compete in 2 distinct markets: circulation and advertising. Assuming that 1 of the newspapers represents the “voice of the majority,” the theory of the circulation spiral...