This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players' valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes a¢çect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players' valuations...

We characterize the structure of optimal assignment rules when both allocative ineffciency and expenditure ineffciency are present. We find that the optimal structure critically depends on how the hazard rate of the value distribution behaves, and that it is often optimal to use probabilistic...

This paper shows that the quality scores in sponsored search auctions can be optimally chosen to extract all the advertisers' surplus. The reason for the full extraction result is that the quality scores may effectively set all the bidders' valuations equal to the highest valuation, which...

We examine mixed bundling in a competitive environment that incorporates vertical product differentiation. We show that, compared to the equilibrium without bundling, (i) prices, profits and social welfare are lower, whereas (ii) consumer surplus is higher in the equilibrium with mixed bundling....

We modify the dynamic pivot mechanism of Bergemann and VAalimAaki (Econometrica, 2010) in such a way that lump-sum fees are collected from the players. We show that the modi?ed mechanism satis?es ex-ante budget balance as well as ex-post e¡¾ciency, periodic ex-post incentive compatibility, and...