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Workaholics and Drop Outs in Optimal Organizations

Muller, Wieland; Schotter, Andrew - Center for Experimental Social Science (CESS), New York … - 2007

This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test the theory of the optimal composition of prizes in … contests. We find that while in the aggregate the behavior of our subjects is consistent with that predicted by the theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005770972

On asymmetry in all-pay auctions

Yoon, Kiho - Institute of Economic Research, Korea University - 2012

This paper examines the role of asymmetry in all-pay auctions. In particular, this paper decomposes a change in players' valuations into the absolute change and the relative change, and analyzes how these changes a¢çect total expenditures. An increase in the sum of players' valuations...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010641739

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504366

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for … the number of prizes is smaller than the number of players, independent of the ranking of the uncertain prize, a player … players' ex-ante expected utility as well the players' expected total effort. Also, increasing the number of prizes may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083545

All-pay auctions with certain and uncertain prizes

Minchuk, Yizhaq; Sela, Aner - In: Games and Economic Behavior 88 (2014) C, pp. 130-134

We study all-pay auctions with multiple prizes. The players have the same value for all the certain prizes except for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011117138

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Modovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - Economics Department, Ben Gurion University of the Negev - 2008

prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498311

Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests

Moldovanu, Benny; Sela, Aner; Shi, Xianwen - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2010

prizes and punish low performance agents with negative prizes. We link the optimal prize structure to the curvature of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008529178

The role of information in contests

Dubey, Pradeep - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 2, pp. 160-163

Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his/her own ability, but may or may not know those of his/her rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more effort and output are engendered under incomplete...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010678824

All-Pay Auctions with Polynomial Rewards

Bos, Olivier; Ranger, Martin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

&D races, lobbying activity and sport contests are captured by this framework. After analyzing the unique mixed strategy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011114126

Best-of-Three All-Pay Auctions

Sela, Aner - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best-of-three all-pay auction. The players have values of winning the contest and may have also values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. It is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661485