Supply function equilibria are used in the analysis of divisible good auctions with a large number of identical objects to be sold or bought. An important example occurs in wholesale electricity markets. Despite the substantial literature on supply function equilibria the existence of a pure...

Scarce interconnector capacities are a severe obstacle to transregional competition and a unified market for electricity in the European Union. However, physically the interconnectors are rarely used up to capacity. This is due to the fact that the current allocation schemes make only limited...

When selling divisible goods such as energy contracts or emission allowances, should the entire supply be auctioned all at once or should it be spread over a sequence of auctions? How does the expected revenue in a sequence of uniform price auctions compare to the expected revenue in a single...

Scarce interconnector capacities are a severe obstacle to transregional competition and a unified market for electricity in the European Union. However, physically the interconnectors are rarely used up to capacity. This is due to the fact that the current allocation schemes make only limited...

We derive equilibrium bidding strategies in divisible good auctions for asymmetrically informed risk neutral and risk averse bidders when there is random noncompetitive demand. The equilibrium bid schedules contain both strategic considerations and explicit allowances for the winner's curse....

Agent-based computational economics is becoming widely used in practice. This paper explores the consistency of some of its standard techniques. We focus in particular on prevailing wholesale electricity trading simulation methods. We include different supply and demand representations and...