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How avoiding overreaction to public information? : some insights on central bank communication practices
Trabelsi, Emna - 2012
It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526649
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How avoiding overreaction to public information? Some insights on central bank communication practices
Trabelsi, Emna - 2012
It is argued in literature that transparency may be detrimental to welfare. Morris and Shin (2002) suggest reducing the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011496184
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Central bank communication: fragmentation as an engine for limiting the publicity degree of information
Trabelsi, Emna - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
In earlier theoretical framework, Morris and Shin (2002) highlight the potential dangers of transparency policy. In …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008694017
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Why the publication of socially harmful information may be socially desirable
Hahn, Volker - 2009 - This version: November 2009
signaling incentives under opacity. Our model may also explain the recent trend towards more transparency in monetary policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008746680
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Limited higher order beliefs and the welfare effects of public information
Cornand, Camille; Heinemann, Frank - 2013
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely behavior of others. This may lead to welfare-reducing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009787097
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Endogenous Information and Central Bank Transparency
Tamura, Wataru - 2015
This paper studies monetary policy under discretion when the central bank ex ante determines information to be acquired and made public. In a general setting, wherein a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information, I show that an optimal information policy comprises the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013026571
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Information Design, Signaling, and Central Bank Transparency
Tamura, Wataru - 2018
This study examines monetary policy and central bank communication when a monetary instrument signals the central bank's private information. A novel feature is that the central bank ex ante determines how much information it acquires and how much of this information it releases to the public....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012930476
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Transparency in Monetary Policy, Signaling, and Heterogeneous Information
Hahn, Volker - 2010
desirable. We show that opacity may lead to the same equilibrium as transparency. However, additional equilibria may emerge … and its effects on inflation and output. In this case, transparency has ambiguous effects. It reduces output variance and … the distortions stemming from heterogeneous information. However, transparency generally raises the variance of inflation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147417
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Policy announcement design
Cieślak, Anna; Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2020 - This version: December 15, 2019
We study the general problem of information design for a policymaker—a central bank—that communicates its private information (the ``state") to the public. We show that it is optimal for the policymaker to partition the state space into a finite number of ``clusters” and to communicate to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181571
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Optimal Public Communication
Gagliardone, Luca - 2022
A benevolent planner chooses optimally whether and how to disclose publicly a private forecast of fundamentals to a large number of informed small agents. These agents interact in economic environments with information frictions, strategic complementarity or substitutability in actions, and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082668