Similar Search Results

Information acquisition ahead of monetary policy announcements

Ehrmann, Michael; Hubert, Paul - 2023

How do financial markets acquire information about upcoming monetary policy decisions, beyond their reaction to central bank signals? This paper hypothesises that sharing information among investors can improve expectations, especially in the presence of disagreement or uncertainty about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014374453

Can more public information raise uncertainty? The international evidence on forward guidance

Ehrmann, Michael; Gaballo, Gaetano; Hoffmann, Peter; … - 2019

Central banks have used different types of forward guidance, where the forward guidance horizon is related to a state contingency, a calendar date or left open-ended. This paper reports cross-country evidence on the impact of these different types of forward guidance on the sensitivity of bond...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012142108

Toothless tiger with claws? Financial stability communication, expectations, and risk-taking

Beutel, Johannes; Metiu, Norbert; Stockerl, Valentin - 2021

We study the effects of central bank communication about financial stability on individuals' expectations and risk-taking. Using a randomized information experiment, we show that communication causally affects individuals' beliefs and investment behavior, consistent with an expectations channel...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012490463

Central bank transparency and nonlinear learning dynamics

Eusepi, Stefano (contributor) - 2008

shows that agents’ learning and the dynamics of the economy are heavily affected by central bank transparency about its …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003781685

FOMC communication policy and the accuracy of fed funds futures

Middeldorp, Menno - 2011

-term forecasting errors. -- central bank communication ; central bank transparency ; futures pricing ; financial market efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008987100

The information content of central bank minutes

Apel, Mikael; Grimaldi, Marianna - 2012

One characteristic feature of central banks today is that policy decisions are almost exclusively made by a committee rather than by a single policy maker. Another is that central banks are considerably more transparent than they used to be. Together, this has brought to the fore an important...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009532244

Monetary policy committee transparency : measurement, determinants, and economic effects

Hayo, Bernd; Mazhar, Ummad - 2011 - This version: 28 September 2011

This paper studies monetary policy committee transparency (MPCT) based on a new index that measures central bankers … variables and institutional transparency, as well as instrumenting MPCT in various ways. -- Monetary Policy Committee … ; Transparency ; Monetary Policy Transparency ; Monetary Policy ; Central Banks …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009305845

Central Bank Transparency, the Accuracy of Professional Forecasts, and Interest Rate Volatility

Middeldorp, Menno H. - 2011

openness from public institutions. Policymakers also see transparency as a way to improve the predictability of monetary policy …. However, there are three reasons why more research is needed. First, some (mostly theoretical) work suggests that transparency … volatility. To extend the literature, I use the Dincer and Eichengreen (2007) transparency index for twenty-four economies of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124570

FOMC Communication Policy and the Accuracy of Fed Funds Futures

Middeldorp, Menno H. - 2011

Over the last two decades, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the rate-setting body of the United States Federal Reserve System, has become increasingly communicative and transparent. According to policymakers, one of the goals of this shift has been to improve monetary policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013126070

Public Communication and Information Acquisition

Chahrour, Ryan - 2012

This paper models the tradeoff, perceived by central banks and other public actors, between providing the public with useful information and the risk of overwhelming it with excessive communication. An information authority chooses how many signals to provide regarding an aggregate state and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013103059