We model a labor market in which workers’ level of education might be a signal of skills. We show that whenever the wage premium for education increases over time – as it might happen under skill biased technological progress – the investment in education needed to sustain a separating...

We consider the problem of trade between a price setting party who has private information about the quality of a good and a price taker who may also have private information. We restrict attention to the case in which, under full information, it is efficient to trade only a subset of all...

We examine a horizontal product differentiation duopoly model where firms are also differentiated with respect to the quality of their products. Firms first choose their locations (or product characteristics) and then compete in prices. Under full information, it is shown that, whereas the...

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our...