Showing 51 - 60 of 1,114
Using experimental techniques, we identify parental attitudes toward different-gendered children in rural Bangladesh. We randomly selected households that had at least two school-age children (6–18 years) of different genders. Parents, either jointly or individually, were given endowments to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011100036
This paper investigates whether parents’ inherent gender bias is associated with intrahousehold human capital investment among boys and girls. We conduct an artifactual field experiment to identify parents’ inherent gender bias and then attempt to examine how this attitude correlates with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011100038
An individual should be indifferent between a rebate subsidy of rate sr and a matching subsidy of rate sm = sr /(1 - sr), and the total amount received by the charity should be the same regardless of subsidy type. Recent laboratory and field experiments contradict these straightforward...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011141118
This dissertation develops an economic theory of leadership based on assignment of information.Common theories assume that organizations exist to reduce transaction costs by replacingimperfect markets with incomplete long term contracts that give managers the power to commandsubordinates. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009433756
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974280
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003505576
This paper suggests that even if it is costless to inform all team members about the quality of a project, there are reasons to concentrate information in the hands of one person (a leader) and prevent full revelation to the rest. This deprives others of the information necessary for profitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839221
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10007759511
An organization makes collective decisions through neither markets nor contracts. Instead, rational agents voluntarily choose to follow a leader. In many cases, incentive problems are solved: the unique nondegenerate equilibrium achieves the first best, even though every agent has incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005820997
Rational players, unconstrained by contracts or formal authority, choose to follow a better-informed leader, whose action reveals part of her information. If the leader satisfies a credibility condition, then the unique nondegenerate equilibrium solves distinct shirking and coordination problems...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577105