We consider oligopolistic markets in which the notion of shareholders'utility is well-defined and compare the Bertrand-Nash equilibria in case of utility maximization with those under the usual profit maximization hypothesis. Our main result states that profit maximization leads to less price...

We consider a simple model of a firm acting strategically on behalf of its shareholders. The price normalization problem arising in general equilibrium models of imperfect competition is overcome by using the concept of real wealth maximization. This concept is based on shareholders' aggregate...

The purpose of this paper is to explore how the concept of a Drèze equilibrium can be extended to multiperiod production economies with incomplete markets. Constrained efficiency cannot serve as a basis for such an extension because multiperiod models tend to violate even weak constrained...

In the quasilinear case, surplus maximization leads to constrained efficient Drèze equilibria. We investigate the question of whether surplus maximization can be useful beyond the quasilinear case. We use two different surplus concepts, the equivalent and the compensating surplus. The first one...

We consider an economy with incomplete markets and a single ¯rm and assume that utility can be freely transferred in the form of the ini- tially available good 0 (quasilinearity). In this particularly simple and transparent framework, the objective of a firm can be defined as the max- imization...