[eng] Econometricians working on stochastic production and cost frontiers have been interested in estimating the inefficiency of firms. At the same time, economists have considered problems of asymmetric information arising in the contractual relationships between principals and agents. This...

This article is an attempt to shed light on the specification and identification of inefficiency in stochastic frontiers. We consider the case of a regulated firm or industry. Applying a simple principal-agent framework that accounts for informational asymmetries to this context, we derive the...

Cet article analyse la renégociation des contrats de gestion déléguée dans le secteur du transport en France. Nous décrivons tout d'abord brièvement le secteur, puis nous présentons dans ses grandes lignes un modèle théorique de renégociation des contrats expliquant les évolutions...

Les économètres ont estimé des frontières de coût et de production afin d'évaluer l'inefficacité des entreprises. En parallèle, les économistes ont considéré des problèmes d'information asymétrique dans les relations contractuelles entre des principaux et des agents. Cet article...

This paper is aimed at assessing the empirical relevance of the new theory of regulation. It relies on a principal-agent framework for studying the regulatory schemes used in the French urban transport industry. Taking the current regulatory schemes as given, the model of supply and demand...

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between public transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the contract choice by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost-reducing activity of the operators. We test whether the current regulatory...

The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural...

The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural...

We consider a framework of contractual interactions between urban transport authorities and transport operators. We estimate simultaneously the choice of contract by the authorities and the effect of regulation on the cost reducing activity of the operators. We test whether regulatory schemes...

The renegotiation of regulatory contracts is known to prevent regulators from achieving the full commitment efficient outcome in dynamic contexts. However, assessing the cost of such renegotiation remains an open issue from an empirical viewpoint. To address this question, we fit a structural...