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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) provides a natural experiment for examining how stock ownership and executive pay structure adapt to a change in regulatory environment. Using annual compensation data of Samp;P 1500 firms in 1994-2005, we examine the impact of SOX on stock ownership and...
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This book argues that the capacity of a country to develop, and the levels of economic and social development achieved, depend more on the institutional parameters within which the development policies are implemented than on the policies themselves. It contends that forces of globalisation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011165050
<Para OutputMedium="Paper">Previous empirical research has found mixed results for the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) investments on corporate financial performance (CFP). This paper contributes to the literature by exploring in a two stage investor decision-making model the relationship between a...</para>
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Chhaochharia and Grinstein (JF, 2009) estimate that CEO pay decreases by 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/NASDAQ board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers out of 865...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013115672
In their reply to our critique, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2012) suggest that (i) Apple is a prime example of how board regulations affect CEO pay and should therefore not be excluded from the study, and (ii) their original results are robust to excluding the outliers when extending the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105085
Using Chhaochharia's and Grinstein's (JF, 2009) data and methodology, Guthrie, Sokolowsky, and Wan (JF, 2010) document that compensation committee independence leads to an increase in executive pay, and that the increase is concentrated in firms with powerful monitors. These findings stand in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013090881