This article studies the relationship between the level of consumers’ inequality (or heterogeneity) and the size of government for the case of an impure public good. It is shown that the size of redistribution (represented by the level of subsidy provided to the firm) increases with the...

This paper studies contracts and incentives to invest in general human capital under common agency. Both the worker and the employer have too weak investment incentives in equilibrium. The employer’s underinvestment results from his failure to internalize the positive impact of his investment...

This paper studies the provision of firm-sponsored general training in the presence of workers’ career concerns. We use a model building on the argument that the acquisition of general skills increases the worker’s bargaining power vis-a-vis the employer. In this context, we show that the...

This paper examines the relationship between firm-specific training and product market competition. A canonical Cournot competition model shows that the profitability of training investments increases as the number of competitors decreases. Empirical evidence from British establishments in 1998,...

We examine the relationship between firm-sponsored training and the sensitivity of product demand to product quality. A quality-adjusted model of monopolistic competition shows the conditions under which the intensity of training increases as product demand becomes more sensitive to quality....