This paper empirically investigates the interaction of formal and informal political institutions as well as lobbying in determining the ability of agriculture to avoid taxation or attract government transfers. Based on our theory we identify specific interaction effects between district size...

This paper studies the ability of the political process to design public policies implying an eective and ecient provision of global and local environmental public goods. While it is commonly accepted that the market is unable to guarantee an ecient provision of public goods, such as...

The literature on political economy analyses of agricultural protection mainly focus on the impact of economic and demographic structures on the level of agricultural protection (Tyers/Anderson 1992, Swinnen 1994, Rausser et al. 1974), although it is commonly accepted that beyond economic and...

The study is devoted to the comparative static analysis and econometric estimation of farm household decisions under both standard and agricultural taxes. To account for labor markets constraints a non-separable model is constructed implying increasing per-unit costs of accessing labor markets....

The seminal papers of Persson and Tabellini have brought increasing interest in analyzing the effects of formal political institutions on economic policy choices. In contrast, the role of participatory policy processes in formulating efficient policies in developing countries has not been...

This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non...