We study repeated legislative bargaining in an assembly that chooses its bargaining rules endogenously, and whose members face an election after each legislative term. An agenda protocol or bargaining rule assigns to each legislator a probability of being recognized to make a policy proposal in...

This article examines recent developments in a literature referred to as `the new institutionalism'. After reviewing some of the consequences for the study of institutions of the behavioral revolution and the elaboration of Arrovian theories of social choice, the author develops the theory of...

type="main" xml:id="ecpo12024-abs-0001" <p>In this article, we elaborate on a strategic view of institutional features. Our focus is on seniority, though we note that this general approach may also be deployed to understand other aspects of institutional arrangements. We have taken the initial...</p>

Models of nomination politics in the USA often find ‘gridlock’ in equilibrium because of the supermajority requirement in the Senate for the confirmation of presidential nominees. A blocking coalition often prefers to defeat any nominee. Yet empirically nominations are successful....