The Tinbergen Rule states that achieving the desired targets requires an equal number of instruments. This paper shows that time inconsistency does not exist in the case of an equal number of instruments and targets. Target uncontrollability and time inconsistency, however, emerge as problems in...

Many argue that, because the outlook for the economy is uncertain, monetary policy should apply a risk management approach by raising the policy interest rate gradually from its lower bound. Using a small New Keynesian model, I study the impact of outlook uncertainty on the economic performance...

This paper investigates how institutional constraints discipline the behavior of discretionary governments subject to an expenditure bias. The focus is on constraints implemented in actual economies: monetary policy targets, limits on the deficit and debt ceilings. For a variety of aggregate...

Monetary policy is most effective when public beliefs about future policies are actively managed. This is the appeal of policy rules and commitment strategies, typically absent under discretion. But when a policymaker has some private information - as is the case in reality - belief management...

In this paper, I investigate the monetary policy of five industrialized countries which have had explicit inflation targets for more than 15 years. Considering the case of discretionary policy as well as commitment, I estimate two first order conditions. The results support the theory of...

We study stationary discretionary equilibria in dynamic linear-quadratic rational expectations models. Past papers have assumed that this is uniquely determined; we show that such models can have multiple equilibria in some situations. We demonstrate the existence of multiple discretionary...

How much discretion should the monetary authority have in setting its policy? This question is analyzed in an economy with an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends on the randomly fluctuating state of the economy. The monetary authority has private information about that state. In the...

How much discretion should the monetary authority have in setting its policy? This question is analyzed in an economy with an agreed-upon social welfare function that depends on the randomly fluctuating state of the economy. The monetary authority has private information about that state. In the...

This paper stresses that estimated policy rules are reduced form equations that are silent on many important policy questions. To obtain a structural understanding of monetary policy it is necessary to estimate the policymaker's objective function, rather than its policy reaction function. With...

This paper examines whether monetary indicators are useful in implementing optimal discretionary monetary policy when the policy maker has incomplete information about the environment. We find that money does not contain useful information for the policy maker, if we calibrate the model to the...