We analyze an endogenous prize all-pay auction under complete information where it is possible that none of the bidders wins and the winning payoff becomes non-monotonic in own bid. We derive the conditions for the existence of pure strategy equilibria and fully characterize the unique mixed...

Behaviour in public good experiments is usually attributed partly to rational self-interest and partly to social norms and preferences. This paper examines if sensitivity to social desirability affects public good contribution and in what way. A pre-experimental measure of social desirability...

The game-theoretic assumption of 'common knowledge of rationality' leads to paradoxes when rationality is represented in a Bayesian framework as cautious expected utility maximisation with independent beliefs (ICEU). We diagnose and resolve these paradoxes by presenting a new class of formal...

We investigate the methodology used in a significant genre of experimental economics, in which experiments are designed to test theoretical models by implementing them in the laboratory. Using two case studies, we argue that such an experiment is a test, not of what the model says about its...

We study antisocial preferences in simple money-burning tasks. A decision maker can choose whether or not to reduce another person's payoff at an own cost. We vary across tasks the initial endowment of the decider and the victim. We find that most conventional expectations are refuted: Subjects...

We examine conditions under which a platform firm can exclude rivals by bundling a product that some on one side of the market regard as essential with its platform, and pursue implications for market performance. We show that the impact of an exclusive dealing contract between the upstream firm...

Standard economic analysis assumes that preferences are independent of markets. However, there is evidence suggesting that price information can influence preferences. We investigate the hypothesis that markets do not simply allow agents to reveal their preferences, but actually help to shape...

Are prices or quantities the best regulatory instrument to align private actions with public interests in the presence of externalities? We add another dimension to this ongoing debate by experimentally analyzing the interaction between instrument choice and intrinsic motivation of regulated...

Recent papers hypothesize that an asymmetry in regret motivates aggressive bidding in laboratory first-price auctions. Subjects emphasize potential earnings foregone from being outbid. Proposed motivators of this asymmetry include the one-to-one relationship in the auction between winning and...

We explore network effects on generosity for different network dimensions. To this end we elicit multiple network dimensions (friendship, social support, economic exchange, etc.) in a rural village in the Southern hemisphere and measure generosity with a sequence of dictator games conducted in...