individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state … variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of political socialization: the family … and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their …

individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state … variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of political socialization: the family … and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their …

individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state … variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of political socialization: the family … and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their …

individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state … variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of political socialization: the family … and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their …

individual commitment across citizens to defend democracy against a potential military coup, and it is an endogenous state … variable of the model along with formal political institutions. We focus on two agencies of political socialization: the family … and the state. Parents invest resources in order to transmit their own political values (commitment to democracy) to their …

society consists of rich and poor individuals. The rich are initially in power, but expect to transition to democracy, which …. This enables them to reduce the amount of redistribution and public good provision in democracy. Moreover, the inefficient … rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient state structure. When the poor come to power in democracy, they will reform …

society consists of rich and poor individuals. The rich are initially in power, but expect to transition to democracy, which …. This enables them to reduce the amount of redistribution and public good provision in democracy. Moreover, the inefficient … rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient state structure. When the poor come to power in democracy, they will reform …

to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats. We show that … democratic politics. This enables them to reduce the amount of redistribution and public good provision in democracy. Moreover … structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient state structure. When the poor come to power in democracy …

to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats. We show that … democratic politics. This enables them to reduce the amount of redistribution and public good provision in democracy. Moreover … structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient state structure. When the poor come to power in democracy …

important consequence of the presence of a strong military is that once transition to democracy takes place, the military poses …We investigate how nondemocratic regimes use the military and how this can lead to the emergence of military … problem; a strong military may not simply work as an agent of the elite but may turn against them in order to create a regime …