We present versions of the two fundamental welfare theorems of economics for exchange economies with a countable number of agents and an infinite dimensional commodity space. These results are then specialized to the overlapping generations model.

An applied general equilibrium analysis of monopoly power is proposed as an alternative to the partial equilibrium analyses of monopoly pricing current in antitrust economics. This analysis introduces a new notion of market equilibrium where firms with monopoly power are cost-minimizing...

In [6], Guha gave a complete characterization of path independent social decision functions which satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, the strong Pareto principle, and UII, i.e., unanimous indifference implies social indifference. These conditions necessarily imply that...

We characterize, in the framework for variational preferences, the affective decision making model of choice under risk and uncertainty introduced by Bracha and Brown (2007). This characterization (i) provides a rigorus decision-theoretic foundation for affective decision making, (ii) offers an...

Recently Cherchye et al. (2011) reformulated the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities, introduced by Brown and Matzkin (1996), as an integer programming problem and proved that solving the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities is NP-hard. Following Brown and Shannon (2000), we reformulate the...

Recently Cherchye et al. (2011) reformulated the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities, introduced by Brown and Matzkin (1996), as an integer programming problem and proved that solving the Walrasian equilibrium inequalities is NP-hard. Following Brown and Shannon (2000), we reformulate the...

An Edgeworth equilibrium is an allocation that belongs to the core of every n-fold replica of the economy. In [2] we studied in the setting of Riesz spaces the properties of Edgeworth equilibria for pure exchange economies with infinite dimensional commodity spaces. In this work, we study the...

An economic agent is said to be weakly myopic if he prefers a time-contingent consumption plan x bar to a time-contingent consumption plany bar, then he prefers x bar x to y bar augmented by any stationary consumption plan which begins sufficiently far in the future. An economic agent is said to...