Islamic banks play a significant role in the financial sector in a number of emerging markets especially countries with a large Muslim population. The objectives of Islamic banks are fundamentally different from those of conventional banks. While conventional banks seek to maximize their...

This chapter examines private pension funds'preferences for shareholder activism in Poland in closely-held firms that dominate stock exchanges in emerging markets. The results show that the major institutional investors engage in a limited spectrum of shareholder activities. Most often, they...

In the last decade, the Chinese government-owned banks have undergone a privatization program resulting in considerable changes in ownership of Chinese banks. These changes invite important questions to be answered. In particular how have banks changed in terms of performance indicators with...

The chapter focuses on the issues concerning corporate governance in emerging markets, with a case study on Romania…Its complex structure covers the ways in which corporate governance is defined by specialists, the historical aspects concerning its appearance and development in the European...

Corporate governance is most often defined in terms of the roles, responsibilities, and interactions of top management and the board of directors. Using information on Macedonia, obtained through various sources, this study is an attempt on determining some of the factors that influence the...

This paper examines the value of political participation by private entrepreneurs in China. Using a unique sample of all initial public offerings by entrepreneurial firms during 1994-2007 and political participation by the controlling entrepreneurs, we test the hypothesis that firms with...

Given an owner's noncommitment timing strategy and a manager's hidden action, we consider how the optimal compensation contract for the manager is designed and how the corresponding timing decisions to launch the project and replace the manager are determined. Using a real options approach, we...

Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong...

Dans le cadre théorique du gouvernement d'entreprise, cet article étudie l'efficacité du contrôle exercé par la structure de propriété et le conseil d'administration sur les dirigeants. La confrontation des théories de l'enracinement et de l'agence permet de déterminer les conditions...

We find evidence consistent with the view that $1 CEO salaries are a ruse hiding the rentseeking pursuits of CEOs adopting these pay schemes. CEOs with these arrangements, despite the drastic cuts in salary, have total compensation that is similar to that at other firms, making up lost salary...