We model a situation where a set of agents must rank themselves based on their opinions. Each agent submits a message and a function determines the social ranking. We are interested in impartial social ranking functions, that is, those where the message of an agent can not change any social...

We model a situation where a set of agents must rank themselves based on their opinions. Each agent submits a message and a function determines the social ranking. We are interested in impartial social ranking functions, that is, those where the message of an agent can not change any social...

This paper proposes a new framework of choice under uncertainty, where the only information available to the decision maker is about the the ordinal likelihood of the di erent outcomes each action generates. This contrasts both with the classical models where the potential out- comes of each...

In this note we introduce a family of functions that various theoretical results have revealed as useful mobility measures. These functions have enabled us to circumvent an impossibility result obtained by Shorrocks (1978), by adapting one of his axioms to the context of mobility as movement. A...

There is a wide range of economic problems involving the exchange of indivisible goods without monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper of Shapley and Scarf [10] and including other problems like the kidney exchange or the school choice problems. For many...