This paper considers the problem of estimating the distribution of payoffs in a discrete dynamic game, focusing on models where the goal is to learn about the distribution of firms' entry and exit costs. The idea is to begin with non parametric first stage estimates of entry and continuation...

This paper presents a theory of matching in vertical networks, generalizing the theory of matching in two-sided markets introduced by Gale and Shapley. Under natural restrictions, stable networks are guaranteed to exist. The set of stable networks is a lattice, with side-optimal stable networks...

We study trading behavior and the properties of prices in informationally complex markets. Our model is based on the single-period version of the linear-normal framework of Kyle (1985). We allow for essentially arbitrary correlations among the random variables involved in the model: the value of...

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, "benchmark," amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the...

We investigate the "generalized second price" auction (GSP), a new mechanism which is used by search engines to sell online advertising that most Internet users encounter daily. GSP is tailored to its unique environment, and neither the mechanism nor the environment have previously been studied...

Despite its importance, voting in the elections of corporate boards of directors remains relatively unexplored in the empirical literature. We construct a comprehensive dataset of 3,204,890 mutual fund votes in director elections that took place between July 2003 and June 2005. We find...

This paper studies information aggregation in dynamic markets with partially informed strategic traders. A natural condition on traded securities and information structure, quot;separability,quot; is introduced. If a security is separable, information about its value always gets aggregated, for...

We study general quadratic games with multidimensional actions, stochastic payoff interactions, and rich information structures. We first consider games with arbitrary finite information structures. In such games, we show that there generically exists a unique equilibrium. We then extend the...

This paper explores information disclosure in matching markets, e.g., the informativeness of transcripts given out by universities. We show that the same, benchmark, amount of information is disclosed in essentially all equilibria. We then demonstrate that if universities disclose the benchmark...