We consider an economy with two types of firms (innovative and non-innovative) and two types of workers (skilled and unskilled), where workers' decisions are driven by imitative behavior, and thus the evolution of such an economy depends on the initial distribution of the firms. We show that...

We study an imitation game of strategic complementarities between the percentage of high-skilled workers and innovative firms, namely, human capital and R&D, respectively. We show that this model has two pure Nash equilibria, one of them with high investment in R&D and skilled workers while the...

En este trabajo se muestran condiciones para la unicidad del equilibrio de Nash-Cournot para un juego de n-firmas. Estas condiciones garantizan que las funciones de mejor respuesta para n-firmas que compiten en forma oligopolica a la Cournot sean contracciones y generalizan las condiciones de...

In this paper we study the dynamics of economic growth for 140 countries during the period 1951-2003. The variables representing economic performance are levels and growth rates of per capita GDP. Using the concept of economic regime, we introduce a notion of distance between the dynamical paths...

In this paper we analyze the rationality that sustains the public investments on white elephants applied to the construction of tourist facilities in Mexico. The main result of this paper is that there exist two kinds of rationalities in the construction of white elephants. One is a similar...