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informative for intermediate conflicts of interest. Finally, we introduce the possibility of certification. We show that, if the … costs of certification are low, the expert can fully reveal her evidence regardless of the conflict of interest. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015098826
It is often argued that certifiers have an incentive to offer inflated certificates, although they deny it. In this paper, we study a model in which a certifier is paid by sellers, and may offer them inflated certificates, but incurs costs if doing so. We find that the certifier may face a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009411261
This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner's dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players' concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding "inequity aversion." In this environment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878527
We consider information transmission in the core of an exchange economy with incomplete information by non-cooperative bargaining theory. Reformulating the coalitional voting game by Serrano and Vohra [Information transmission in coalitional voting games, J. of Economic Theory (2007), 117-137]...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004992471
We consider information transmission in the core of an exchange economy with incomplete information by non-cooperative bargaining theory. Reformulating the coalitional voting game by Serrano and Vohra [Information transmission in coalitional voting games, J. of Economic Theory (2007), 117-137]...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008495521
In an exchange economy with incomplete information, the signaling core is defined by the set of state-contingent allocations to which no coalitions object under informational leakage through proposals by informed agents. An objection underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572398
In an information transmission situation, a sender's concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible …, the sender can achieve its favored outcome without losing its credibility, which stays true even when the sender and the … receiver have contradictory preferences. Therefore, the sender's concern for its credibility could result in less truthful …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789900
In an information transmission situation, a senders concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible … power to control the detected. In this case, the sender can achieve its favored outcome without losing its credibility … its credibility could result in less truthful signals from the sender and worse payoffs to the receiver. This is the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009365389
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests with two-sided incomplete information. Private information may concern marginal cost, valuations, and ability. Our main result says that, if the contest is uniformly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014333781
We analyze a cheap-talk model in which an informed sender and an uninformed receiver engage in a finite-period communication before the receiver chooses a project. During the communication phase, the sender sends a message in each period, and the receiver then voluntarily pays money for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537029