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It is often argued that certifiers have an incentive to offer inflated certificates, although they deny it. In this paper, we study a model in which a certifier is paid by sellers, and may offer them inflated certificates, but incurs costs if doing so. We find that the certifier may face a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009411261
In an information transmission situation, a senders concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible … power to control the detected. In this case, the sender can achieve its favored outcome without losing its credibility … its credibility could result in less truthful signals from the sender and worse payoffs to the receiver. This is the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009365389
In an information transmission situation, a sender's concern for its credibility could endow itself with an invisible …, the sender can achieve its favored outcome without losing its credibility, which stays true even when the sender and the … receiver have contradictory preferences. Therefore, the sender's concern for its credibility could result in less truthful …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789900
This paper investigates behavior in finitely repeated simultaneous and sequential-move prisoner's dilemma games when there is one-sided incomplete information and signaling about players' concerns for fairness, specifically, their preferences regarding "inequity aversion." In this environment,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010878527
We consider information transmission in the core of an exchange economy with incomplete information by non-cooperative bargaining theory. Reformulating the coalitional voting game by Serrano and Vohra [Information transmission in coalitional voting games, J. of Economic Theory (2007), 117-137]...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008495521
In an exchange economy with incomplete information, the signaling core is defined by the set of state-contingent allocations to which no coalitions object under informational leakage through proposals by informed agents. An objection underlying the signaling core is supported by a sequential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572398
We consider information transmission in the core of an exchange economy with incomplete information by non-cooperative bargaining theory. Reformulating the coalitional voting game by Serrano and Vohra [Information transmission in coalitional voting games, J. of Economic Theory (2007), 117-137]...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004992471
Can comparative statements be credible even when absolute statements are not? For instance, can a professor credibly rank different students for a prospective employer even if she has an incentive to exaggerate the merits of each student? Or can an analyst credibly rank different stocks even if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263292
way that can be predicted by the credibility of the neologism; and receivers' behavior indicates that they understand …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751
Can comparative statements be credible even when absolute statements are not? For instance, can a professor credibly rank different students for a prospective employer even if she has an incentive to exaggerate the merits of each student? Or can an analyst credibly rank different stocks even if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005795951