We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. All of these contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive rights to specify and enforce dealers' duties. The allocation of decision...

Retailers often stock competing products from multiple manufacturers. When the retailer stocks out of a particular item, customers who prefer the item are likely, with some probability, to switch to a substitute product from another manufacturer at the same store. In such an event, a quot;lost...

We study the implications of different contractual forms in a market with an incumbent upstream monopolist and free downstream entry. We show that traditional conclusions regarding the desirability of linear contracts radically change when entry in the downstream market is endogenous rather than...

This paper is interested in the analysis of Blockchains and Smart-contracts applied to inter-firms relationships, in particular the franchise networks. After defining the Blockchain technology and the Smart-contract as a particular type of contract stored in blockchains, we question the theory...

This paper investigates the effects of changes in retail market concentration when input prices are negotiated. Results are derived from a model of bilateral Nash-bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition. Whether...

Russian Abstract: Статья об объективных закономерностях формирования социально-экономических институтов в системе электронной коммерции. Бурное развитие...

The purpose of this study is to analyse the business performance, i.e. business efficiency of the New York Times in the process of its digital transformation. The main methodology used in this study is the regression analysis. This research focuses on the financial efficiency of the New York...

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. All of these contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive rights to specify and enforce dealers' duties. The allocation of decision...

We examine the implications of different contractual forms for welfare as well as for firms’ profits in a framework in which a vertically integrated firm sells its good to an independent downstream firm. Under downstream Bertrand competition, the standard result of the desirability of two-part...

We set up a merger game between retailing stores to study the incentives of independent stores to form a big store when some consumers have preferences for one-stop shopping. Such one-stop shopping creates complementarity between products, leading in turn to lower prices after a big store is...