Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent companies from profiting from insider information. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a...

We analyse the reasons why companies issue units when they raise additional capital. In contrast to previous evidence, our results show that units are not offered to mitigate the agency conflicts or to signal security mispricing as they are predominantly issued during cold periods, in public...

Investors often fail to incorporate all relevant information when they make decisions. This is a consequence of both information overload and investors’ limited cognitive abilities. The first essay shows that firms take advantage of investors’ inattention by managing the advance notice...

The AFEP-MEDEF corporate governance code amended in 2013 introduces the say on pay principle, which grants shareholders the right to vote on executive remuneration at annual general meetings. This paper aims at reviewing the studies undertaken in countries that have established this principle...

We examine board structure in France, which since 1966 has allowed firms freedom to choose between unitary and two-tier boards. We analyze how this choice relates to characteristics of the firm and its environment. Firms with severe asymmetric information tend to opt for unitary boards; firms...