We study the target projection dynamic, a model of learning in normal form games. The dynamic is given a microeconomic foundation in terms of myopic optimization under control costs due to a certain status-quo bias. We establish a number of desirable properties of the dynamic: existence,...

In this article we discuss the differences between the average marginal effect and the marginal effect of the average individual in sample selection models, estimated by the Heckman procedure. We show that the bias that emerges as a consequence of interchanging the measures, could be very...

I consider a gamble where the sum of the distributed payoffs is proportionate to the number of participants. I show that no subset of the population can agree to participate in the bet, if the size of the group is commonly known. Repeated announcements of the number of the participants leads the...

This paper studies the target projection dynamic, which is a model of myopic adjustment for population games. We put it into the standard microeconomic framework of utility maximization with control costs. We also show that it is well-behaved, since it satisfies the desirable properties: Nash...

In this paper we discuss the differences between the average marginal effect and the marginal effect of the average individual in sample selection models, estimated by Heckman's two step procedure. We show that the bias that emerges as a consequence of interchanging them, could be very...

We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show that, in contrast with claims to the contrary in the existing literature, communication under a fair protocol may not lead to common knowledge of signals. We prove that commonly known signals are...

We study whether rational information processing is testable. Our main result shows that, under positive conditions, negative introspection holds if and only if it holds for primitive propositions. In particular, it is sufficient to test negative introspection on primitive propositions.<p>

In a recent paper, Tsakas [2013 Rational belief hierarchies, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Maastricht University] introduced the notion of rational beliefs. These are Borel probability measures that assign a rational probability to every Borel event. Then, he constructed the corresponding...

We provide a foundation for correlated rationalizability by means of pairwise epistemic conditions imposed only on some pairs of players. Indeed, we show that pairwise mutual belief, for some pairs of players, of (i) the game payoffs, (ii) rationality, and (iii) deeming possible only strategy...