We examine the relationship between the prices paid by households and their shopping patterns measured in terms of shopping frequency and the range of stores visited. We use the TNS data which allows us to control for household heterogeneity. The main contribution of the paper is that we find...

This paper proposes a novel approach in a general equilibrium model to assess how belief heterogeneity affects equilibrium and contract origination. The market offers a menu of collateralized debt contracts depending on leverage and interest rates. Borrowers select a single contract from the...

We examine the relationship between the prices paid by households and their shopping patterns measured in terms of shopping frequency and the range of stores visited. We use the TNS data which allows us to control for household heterogeneity. The main contribution of the paper is that we find...

We propose a framework to link empirical models of systemic risk to theoretical network/general equilibrium models used to understand the channels of transmission of systemicrisk. The theoretical model allows for systemic risk due to interbank counterpartyrisk, common asset exposures/fire sales,...

This paper reports the results of an experimental test of the Nash equilibrium prediction of voluntary provision of property rights in a contest under anarchy. Specically, the experiment investigates whether pre-commitment induces positive provision of property rights. As pre- dicted, zero...

This paper examines the endogenous formation of coalitions that provide public goods in which players implement a minimum participation requirement before deciding whether to join. We demonstrate theoretically that payoff-maximizing players will vote to implement efficient participation...

Punishment has been shown to be an effective reinforcement mechanism. Intentional or not, punishment will likely generate spillover effects that extend beyond one’s immediate decision environment, and these spillovers are not as well understood. We seek to understand these secondary spillover...

We use experiments to study coordination in games with incomplete information and ask whether an informed player can use cheap talk strategically. Two players decide whether to enter a market where stage game payoffs either form a prisoner’s dilemma or a stag-hunt. One player knows which stage...