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Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems

Forges, Françoise; Serrano, Roberto - 2011

incomplete information. We discuss exchange economies, cooperative Bayesian games with orthogonal coalitions, and issues of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284071

Walras and dividends equilibrium with possibly satiated consumers

Allouch, Nizar; Le Van, Cuong - 2006

The main contribution of the paper is to provide a weaker non-satiation assumption than the one commonly used in the literature to ensure the existence of competitive equilibrium. Our assumption allows for satiation points inside the set of individually feasible consumptions, provided that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284176

Small informational size and interim cores of large quasilinear economies

Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - 2018

We provide nonemptiness results of approximate interim cores with endogenous communication in large quasilinear economies, where every agent's informational size is small. We offer results for both replica and more general sequences of economies.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012058641

Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2001

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318986

Walras and dividends equilibrium with possibly satiated consumers

Allouch, Nizar; Van, Cuong Le - Development and Policies Research Center (Depocen) - 2008

The main contribution of the paper is to provide a weaker nonsatiation assumption than the one commonly used in the literature to ensure the existence of competitive equilibrium. Our assumption allows for satiation points in the set of individually feasible consumptions, provided that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968669

Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies

Yannelis, Nicholas C.; Hahn, Guangsug - In: Economic Theory 18 (2001) 2, pp. 485-509

main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753202

Information transmission and core convergence in quasilinear economies

Kamishiro, Yusuke; Serrano, Roberto - Instituto de Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Madrileño de … - 2008

refinement of Myerson's core for which information disseminates across coalitions within a given random blocking mechanism. Under …We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions … in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions and the incentive constraints are relevant …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005764674

EQUILIBRIUM BLOCKING IN LARGE QUASILINEAR ECONOMIES

Serrano, Roberto; Kamishiro, Yusuke - Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) - 2009

We study information transmission in large interim quasilinear economies using the theory of the core. We concentrate … on the core with respect to equilibrium blocking, a core notion in which information is transmitted endogenously within … coalitions, as blocking can be understood as an equilibrium of a communication mechanism used by players in coalitions. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008518033

Marshallian Money, Welfare, and Side-Payments

Qin, Chen-Zhong; Shapley, Lloyd S.; Shubik, Martin - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

parameters specifying the interpersonal comparisons in the side-payment game. We study this game for the properties of the delta-core …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008479208

Stable Sets in multi-good pillage games are small

Breardon, Alan F.; Rowat, Colin - Department of Economics, University of Birmingham - 2010

It is known that, in one-good pillage games, stable sets are finite. For m goods, it has been conjectured that the stable sets have measure zero. We introduce a class of sets, termed pseudo-indifference sets, which includes level sets of utility functions, quasi-indifference classes associated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577219