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We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. (Copyright: Fundación Empresa Pública)
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005690062
enforcement of contracts is, therefore, limited by incentive com-patibility constraints. We formalize a notion of the core for … core, or as an attempt to introduce coalitional contracts in the Holmstrom-Myerson [1983] notion of incentive efficiency …. While there are some special cases in which the incentive compatible core is non-empty, our main result shows that this is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005405675
main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753202
The present paper provides three different support results for the Nash bargaining solution of $n$-person bargaining games. First, for any bargaining game there is defined a non-cooperative game in strategic form, whose unique Nash equilibrium induces a payoff vector that coincides with the Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596761
Function, given individual rationality and feasibility constraints. We prove that solutions belong to the core for a large …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005596804
communication plans and establish the existence of core strategies for this cooperative game under various regularity conditions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597875
lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core …. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618893
This paper examines the implementation of two public ownership solutions in convex production economies with differentiable production functions. The two public ownership solutions we focus on are the proportional and equal benefit solutions. Two "natural" mechanisms which doubly implement the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639264
We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005696867
original one. The use of Aubin coalitions allows us to connect results with the arbitrage free condition due to non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010800987