The core of an economy consists of those attainable allocations of the economy which no group of agents (coalition) can … "improve upon". This paper presents a concept of core of a production economy with a finite number of agents with asymmetric … core of this economy. The proof is based on a (quasi) fixed point theorem. …

core coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations. Because of the indivisibility, the preference …

. We prove that the strong core coincides with the set of cost-minimized Walras allocations which satisfy both the …

We provide a result for non-emptiness of the core in NTU games. We use a payoffs-dependent balancedness condition …, based on transfer rate mappings. Going beyond the non-emptiness of standard core, existence of some refined solution is … proved, including specific core allocations and equilibrium-core allocations in parameterized collection of cooperative games …

structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved - namely, core stability and internal … coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed "potential … internal stability") for most small coalitions. The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing …

structure and of the definition of the two game theoretical stability notions involved – namely, core stability and internal … coalition nor for most large coalitions, it is nevertheless verified in a weak sense that involves transfers (dubbed “potential … internal stability”) for most small coalitions. The reason for this difference is brought to light, namely the differing …

coalitionally stable agreements are achieved via intermediate self-selecting subcoalitions.  The sequence of coalitions forming and …