Within the framework proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978)for mod- elling quality di .erentiation,we allow consumers to buy simultane- joint purchase .We show that this option dramatically a .ects price competition:while a unique equilibrium always prevails when consumers are assumed to make...

We define a new strategic equilibrium concept -called strong collusion- proof contract -designed to characterize stable communication agreements in games with differential information against non-binding, self enforcing and incentive compatible deviations by coalitions.We then construct a...

Our object of study is a multiclass queueing network (MQNET) which consists of a collection of (connected) single server stations. Exogenous arrivals into the system from independant poisson streams, service times are exponential and we have Markovian routing of customers between stations.

This paper proposes a new kind of asymmetric GARCh where the conditional variance obeys two different regimes with a smooth transition function. In one formulation, the conditional variance reacts differently to negative and positive shocks while in a second formulation, small and big shocks...

In an open economy, outside money in positive supply does not eliminate the real indeterminacy which arises under uncertainty and incomplete asset markets. If money supply is subject to shocks or is not perfectly credible in all countries, the level of a fixed exchange rate matters. Analogous...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna. We show that a foreign producer would choose a...