We model the decision problems faced by the members of societies whose new members are determined by vote. We adopt a number of simplifying assumptions. In spite of these simplifications, we show that interesting strategic behavior is implied by the dynamic structure of the problem: the vote for...

We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with .nitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully im plement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium conce pt, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium,and show that the Walrasian...

This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a...

Much attention has been given to the impact of fiscal competition on the level of public expenditure, but relatively little to the impact on its composition. Using a broadly familiar and reasonably rich model of fiscal competition in the presence of mobile capital, this paper establishes a...

In Van den Akker, Van Hoesel, and Savelsbergh (1994), we have studied a time-indexed formulation for single-machine scheduling problems and have presented a complete characterization of all facet inducing inequalities with right-hand side 1 and 2 for the convex hull of the monotone extension of...