This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal / agent model by a …. The agent's subsequent choice of e ort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We nd that the … consideration of e ort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if …

This paper analyses the relation between authority and incentives. It extends the standard principal / agent model by a …. The agent's subsequent choice of e ort depends both on monetary incentives and the selected project. We nd that the … consideration of e ort incentives makes the principal less likely to delegate the authority over projects to the agent. In fact, if …

relates to the candidates type . Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment and offering tenure or guaranteed …

The existing delegation literature has focused on different preferences of principal and agent concerning project … selection, which makes delegating authority costly for the principal. This paper shows that delegation has a cost even when the … without task commitment and other behavioral effects the principal might forgo delegation though being efficient. …