We examine how political connections impact the process of going public. Specifically, we test how political connections impact the pricing of newly offered shares, the magnitude of underpricing, and the fixed cost of going public. Based on experiences of the new public firms in the Chinese...

Corporate Governance Equalisation: What does an organisation stand to win/loose by upholding high/low standards of good corporate governance? If stakeholders are knowledgeable on the implications of good corporate governance implications on the value of the firm, there is room for equalisation...

European family-controlled public companies tend to perform less well in the stock market than their American counterparts. Also, while more and more investment funds that focus on family-firm opportunities are being formed in the United States, data indicates that institutional investors remain...

2005 will be remembered as the year of revolution in Corporate Financial Risk Management (CFRM), due to three extraordinary phenomena: 1) the adoption of new international accounting standards (IAS) across Europe; 2) the growing awareness of the need for new corporate governance rules; and,...

This paper presents a continuous time model of a firm that can dynamically adjust both its capital structure and its investment choices. The model extends the dynamic capital structure literature by endogenizing the investment choice as well as firm value, which are both determined by an...

Capital markets perform two distinct functions: provision of capital and facilitation of good governance through information production and monitoring. I argue that the governance function has more impact on the efficiency with which resources are utilized within the firm. Based on industry...

Using a broad socio-economic conception of capital markets agency relationships, this study analyzes an immportant economic transition in US economic history. It focuses on the institutional and informational changes that attended the reform of corporare governance and regulation in the railroad...

The paper investigates why the corporate landscapes of Germany and UK are so different in terms of control by analyzing ownership and control evolution in recent IPOs. We report the control evolution of a sample of size- and industry-matched German and UK companies six years subsequent to the...

We analyse why the control of listed German and UK companies is so different. As shareholders in Germany are less protected and control is less expensive, German investors prefer controlling stakes. We also focus on economic factors such as profitability, risk and growth to predict the...

The paper investigates why the corporate landscapes of Germany and UK are so different in terms of control by analyzing ownership and control evolution in recent IPOs. We report the control evolution of a sample of size- and industry-matched German and UK companies six years subsequent to the...