There exists a continuum of prices between Bertrand and joint-profit maximization prices which can be interpreted as the outcome of a two-stage game where firms first invest to increase product differentiation and then compete in prices. The lower the costs of differentiating their products from...

We analyse the optimal antitrust enforcement against collusion under asymmetric information with a continuum of types. We focus on prudential deterrence, by imposing that expected fines cannot induce losses even off the equilibrium path. Due to incentive compatibility, efficient cartels enjoy...

We propose a general formal structure for symmetric information delegation games that encompasses many existing economic applications in the fields of oligopoly theory, the theory of the firm, strategic trade policy and international political economy. We prove that all individually rational...

We study the enforcement of competition policy against collusion under Leniency Programs, which give reduced fines to firms revealing information to the Antitrust Authority. Such programs give firms an incentive to break collusion, but may also have a pro-collusive effect, since they decrease...

In this article we analyse the effects of different regulatory schemes (price cap and profit sharing) on a firm's investment of endogenous size. Using a real option approach in continuous time, we show that profit sharing does not affect a firm's start-up decision relative to a pure price cap...

In this paper we review and extend the theory of quality regulation and of self-regulation and try to see to what extent the present theoretical literature can help to direct the regulatory reform of Italian financial markets. In financial markets, several countries have heavily relied upon self...

Restructuring firms in a transition economy produces a sort of network externality, in that the profitability of restructuring depends on the number of firms that already adopted this strategy. We investigate under what conditions a ''critical mass'' exists, i.e. a situation in which such...