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Optimal Leniency Programs when Firms Have Cumulative and Asymmetric Evidence
Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - Department Volkswirtschaftlehre, Universität Bern - 2014
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884994
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Optimal leniency programs
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2000
Leniency programmes reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. We focus on their ability to deter cartels and organised crime in general by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programmes that reduce/cancel sanctions for the reporting party cannot affect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608606
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Optimal leniency programs when firms have cumulative and asymmetric evidence
Blatter, Marc; Emons, Winand; Sticher, Silvio - 2014
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011420625
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Cartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidence
Klein, Gordon J. - 2010
Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be effective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but these effects are not straight-forward. It is even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010304327
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Private and Public Control of Management
Angelucci, Charles; Han, Martijn A. - Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko, … - 2012
This paper investigates the design of a leniency policy to fight corporate crime. We explicitly take into account the agency problem within the firm. We model this through a three-tier hierarchy: authority, shareholder, and manager. The manager may breach the law and report evidence to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277265
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Trust, Leniency and Deterrence
Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - Konkurrensverket, Government of Sweden - 2014
This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment studying the channels through which dierent law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies oering immunity to the rst reporting party, a high ne is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong eect even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277367
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Leniency, Collusion, Corruption, and Whistleblowing
Luz, Reinaldo; Spagnolo, Giancarlo - 2016
Leniency policies offering immunity to the first cartel member that blows the whistle and self-reports to the antitrust … forms of leniency (or rewards) for unveiling corruption, a policy offering immunity from antitrust sanctions may not be … for corruption. This paper assesses the extent of this problem by describing and discussing the antitrust and anti …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012110663
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The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
Emons, Winand - 2018
An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. It chooses the probability of an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012112083
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Private and public control of management
Angelucci, Charles; Han, Martijn A. - 2012
This paper investigates the design of a leniency policy to fight corporate crime. We explicitly take into account the agency problem within the firm. We model this through a three-tier hierarchy: authority, shareholder, and manager. The manager may breach the law and report evidence to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318772
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Rebating antitrust fines to encourage private damages actions
Emons, Winand; Lenhard, Severin - 2020
To encourage private actions for damages in antitrust cases some jurisdictions subtract a fraction of the redress from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420701